Mentalization of Social Psychology Is a Sign of Its Maturity by Kofta, Mirosław
Mentalization of Social Psychology Is a Sign of Its 
Maturity
Mirosław Kofta1 
1 University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
Corresponding author: Mirosław Kofta (University of Warsaw, Psychology Faculty, Department of Personality Psy-
chology, Stawki street 5/7, 00-183 Warsaw, Poland. E-mail: kofta@psych.uw.edu.pl)
Received: 6 March 2018 • Published: 29 May 2018
Citation: Kofta, M. (2018). Mentalization of social psychology is a sign of its maturity. Social Psychological Bulletin, 
13(2), Article e26137. https://doi.org/10.5964/spb.v13i2.26137
Abstract
Dariusz Doliński’ (2018, this issue) analysis strongly suggests that social psychologists are no 
longer interested in studying real human behavior and have switched their attention to internal 
cognitive processing and its interplay with motivational and affective phenomena. I propose to 
call this phenomenon ‘the mentalization shift’. In my commentary three issues are addressed: 
(i) Why has this phenomenon occured? (ii) Is it really so that we have ceased to study behavior, 
or rather we still do that, albeit differently? (iii) And, finally, is the mentalization of present-day 
social psychology something that is uniformly bad, or just a sign of the field’s maturing process? 
Nobody would oppose that modern social psychology offers more and more sophisticated instru-
ments for explaining rather than for predicting and controlling human behavior. However, at 
an inevitable cost incurred by the advancement of our theoretical thinking, this is a sign of an 
increasing maturity of social psychology as a science rather than symptom of its deterioration.
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Dariusz Doliński’s (2018, this issue) target article raises an important issue regarding the 
extent to which present day social psychology is still a science of human behavior. Un-
doubtedly, from its very beginning, experimental social psychology has had strong behav-
ioristic roots. In the 1960s, the majority of social psychologists believed that the proper 
task of our discipline was to understand, explain, and predict human social behavior in 
its natural context. So, we studied the dynamics of social interaction in the framework 
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of group-decision, aggressive behavior, prosocial behavior, social influence, psychologi-
cal reactance, delay of gratification, and even horn-honking behavior, frequently done in 
natural surroundings (e.g., on the street, in the underground/metro, in the classroom or 
kindergarten). Simultaneously, researchers made an effort to develop new experimental 
procedures for investigating some behavioral phenomena in the laboratory, resulting in 
the emergence of famous behavioral paradigms for studying obedience to authority (cre-
ated by Stanley Milgram, 1963), and human aggression (developed by Leon Berkowitz, see 
e.g. Berkowitz & Lepage, 1967).
Of course, within this framework, researchers were also interested in formulating 
theoretical ideas about internal cognitive-motivational mechanisms of human behavior 
(as exemplified by cognitive dissonance and reactance studies, and research on diffusion 
of responsibility, see, e.g., Festinger, 1957; Brehm, 1966; Latane & Darley, 1970). Never-
theless, a clear objective of the field was to explain human behavior in its natural context. 
Moreover, laboratory experiments with behavioral measures were treated as initial steps 
in the explanation of human behavior: it was typically expected that some behavioral 
phenomenon, demonstrated in the laboratory, would be successfully replicated with “real 
people” (not psychology students) in real social settings. This was thought to provide the 
ultimate evidence in validating our theories and experiments.
Largely, due to an emergence of the social cognition perspective (Abrams & Hogg, 
1999; Fiske & Taylor, 1984), social psychology underwent a fundamental change. As 
shown by Dariusz Doliński, based on the example of the recent volumes of JPSP, the most 
influential journal in our domain, social-psychological research has nowadays little to do 
with studying overt behavior, wherein nearly all studies addressed attitudes, beliefs, feel-
ings, social information processing, and affective responses. The studies did not actually 
address how humans behave in real-life social surroundings. Laboratory behavior, if meas-
ured, has an extremely reduced form, typically consisting of tapping a computer keyboard 
or touching a computer or smartphone screen.
So, we are witnessing a revolutionary change both at the level of conceptualization 
and measurement. It looks like social psychologists are no longer interested in studying 
real human behavior and have switched their attention to internal cognitive processing 
and its interplay with motivational and affective phenomena. One may call it ‘the men-
talization shift’. In my commentary, I would like to address three issues: (i) Why has this 
phenomenon occurred? (ii) Is it really so that we have ceased to study behavior, or do we 
still do that, albeit differently? (iii) And, finally, is the mentalization of present day social 
psychology something that is uniformly bad, or just a sign of the field’s maturing process?
Why Has This Phenomenon Occurred?
While trying to explain the described mentalization shift, in general, one may attribute this 
to a cognitive revolution in psychology, particularly in social psychology. The cognitive 
revolution, which originated in the sixties and seventies of the 20th century, essentially 
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meant that human behavior was no longer approached as a ‘thing in itself’, but as a way of 
expressing meaning and intention. According to this assumption, we cannot even identify 
what behavior is without taking into account its mental premises (thoughts, beliefs, ex-
pectations, ideas, intentions, personal values and norms). Thus, the notion of behavior has 
been broadened to include its internal psychological component as an indispensable ele-
ment. This might be one of the reasons for the mentalization shift.
Within social psychology, an important ingredient of this mentalistic revolution was 
discovering the self as an implicit agent of human experience and behavior. Researchers 
took it for granted that, to understand human social behavior, we must postulate the ex-
istence of an agentic force within the human mind allowing the integration of individual 
experience and the generation of intentions. This internal mechanism – the self-structure 
– was in turn thought to account for stable, individualized, and personalized patterns of 
social behavior. Such notions like self-evaluation, self-concept, self-knowledge, self-iden-
tity, self-continuity, self-certainty, self-agency, self-presentation, social self, interpersonal 
self, collective self, independent vs. interdependent self, are nowadays commonly used in 
the social psychological language (see, e.g., Forgas & Williams, 2002; Sedekides & Brewer, 
2001). With the focus on the critical role of the self, one can observe an increasing inter-
est in human subjectivity, i.e., the way people experience themselves and the external 
world (see, e.g., Bless & Forgas, 2000). How we behave is traced to what is experienced, 
wherein objective behavior is nothing more than an expression of internal dynamics of 
the human mind.
As a consequence of the mentalization shift and discovering the self, present-day so-
cial psychology is predominantly focused on the way we give meaning to our experience 
(Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012; van den Bos, 2009). Human efforts to understand and explain 
the world, people’s emotional lives, self-construals, beliefs and convictions have emerged 
as primary objectives of social psychological investigation. Consequently, studying overt 
behavior in the real-life context has lost its priority, and is no longer the major task for the 
social psychologist.
Is It Really so That We Have Ceased to Study Behavior?  
Here I want to provide some arguments in support of a thesis that argues that an undisput-
able mentalization shift does not actually mean that researchers have stopped studying hu-
man behavior. First, in several areas of social psychology, particularly in inter-disciplinary 
research that includes social psychological constructs and variables, we see mounting 
interest in studying forms of behavior that have previously been ignored. Let me mention 
three examples.
In the studies on stereotype threat, social psychologists collaborate with cognitive 
psychologists and students of human abilities, using intensively objective measures of 
cognitive performance as important indices of the phenomenon. Within this context, 
they investigate problem-solving and performance on complex, cognitively demanding 
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tasks, and executive functions (see, e.g., Rydell, Van Loo, & Boucher, 2014). In behav-
ioral economics, a research area strongly inspired by social psychological theorizing 
and methods, investigators study human economic behavior with several behavioral 
indices of strategies applied by participants as critical dependent variables (Diamond 
& Vartiainen, 2012). Finally, in experimental research on social power, we again see 
deep interest in measuring not only subjective assessments, but also objective behav-
ioral changes attributable to power positions taken by research participants (see, e.g., 
Guinote, 2017).
An interesting new area of behavioral research has emerged in social psychophysiol-
ogy. Students of power tried to link power relationships to activity in the human brain, 
and found interesting correlates (e.g., research on the relationship between power position 
and activity of the motor cortex, see Schmid, Kleiman, & Amodio, 2015). There were also 
attempts to link individual differences in left-right political preferences with reactivity of 
the amygdala to emotion-laden stimuli, (see Tritt, Inzlicht, & Peterson, 2014). Thus, social 
psychologists are extensively engaged in research projects, in which they study behavior of 
the human brain using new methodologies. Thus, even if it is valid that main-stream social 
psychology is becoming increasingly mentalistic, several new lines of interdisciplinary re-
search, with a strong social psychological ingredient, have some form of human behavior 
as its main focus.
Within this context, I would extend my comment to the issue of ‘reduced behavior’ 
(that is to say, preference for social psychologists to measure responses on a keyboard 
instead of observing complex social reactions in natural surroundings). Obviously, it is 
much easier to measure such a “cliquing behavior” than full-scale human action in a natu-
ral social interaction!
However, we should understand that ‘clicking behavior’ is going to be a very frequent 
and natural form of social behavior, e.g., on the internet, or in one’s smartphone use. 
Moreover, this very simple way of responding might be used on the internet for a variety 
of purposes, including finding a romantic partner, attracting new friends, expressing po-
litical opinions, acquiring knowledge about a particular social/political reality, engaging 
in public activity (e.g., signing a petition), and so on. Also, in laboratory studies, simple 
motor responses might be used for a variety of purposes, including the measurement of 
social categories’ accessibility, studying working memory operations, attention manage-
ment, dual task performance, decision making, memory encoding and retrieval, and so on. 
So, the simplicity of overt reactions might in actuality reflect complex human behavior. 
To link simple responses with complex psychological activity, we of course need a good 
theory allowing the establishment of reliable behavioral indices of internal processing.
Is the Mentalization of Present Day Social Psychology Bad?
The final question seems fundamental and asks whether the mentalization shift, a salient 
feature of present day social psychology, is something to complain about, or, rather, a sign 
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of its scientific maturity? I might agree that the current focus of social psychological re-
search on internal mental states and structures may make it more difficult to provide direct 
implications for promoting and/or changing overt human social behavior. Undoubtedly, 
this kind of knowledge is much more difficult to apply in social practice. Nobody would 
oppose that modern social psychology offers more and more sophisticated instruments 
for explaining rather than for predicting and controlling human behavior. However, at an 
inevitable cost incurred by the advancement of our theoretical thinking, this is a sign of an 
increasing maturity of social psychology as a science.
General social psychological knowledge is thus not enough. To be able to predict and 
control human behavior in concrete cultural and institutional settings, we have to develop 
applied research focused directly on practical issues. Recent achievements in the psychol-
ogy of intergroup relations are good illustrations of this point. To improve these relations, 
it is therefore not enough to only understand the complexity of social psychological mech-
anisms accounting for the development of conflict relationships between human groups 
(including categorization processes and mutual stereotyping, the role of group identifica-
tion, intergroup competition and threat, system justification processes, and so on). It is a 
more practical matter, requiring direct testing of some theoretically grounded treatments, 
which promises to remove some obstacles and promote efficient means of conflict reso-
lution. Sometimes, such attempts need years to finally find a relatively simple solution. 
A good example is the history of the contact hypothesis originally advanced by Gordon 
Allport (1954) in his seminal book on “The nature of prejudice”. After half a century of 
research, it appeared that the critical point to determine the effectiveness of contact in 
improving intergroup relations is to have at least one friend ‘on the other side’ (e.g., Page-
Gould, Mendoza-Denton, & Tropp, 2008). One close tie developed with a single outgroup 
member leads to the reduction of intergroup anxiety, thereby resulting in a relatively last-
ing improvement of intergroup relations.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we do observe what I’m inclined to call the ‘mentalization shift’ in cur-
rent social psychology. Researchers in this domain focus more and more on internal, 
unobservable mind states, processes, and structures, with increasing neglect for overt 
social behavior. In my comment I tried to show that this tendency, which is quite natu-
ral, is particularly strong in mainstream, basic social psychological research. However, 
in interdisciplinary research that includes a social psychological perspective, an inter-
est in studying human behavior is still quite strong. I am also suggesting that to partly 
regain the original “behavioristic” flavor, social psychologists should engage more 
vigorously in the development of theory-driven applied research. It is possible that this 
could help restore the feeling that social psychology is not only a valuable source of un-
derstanding how humans behave, but also helps to effectively predict social behavior in 
real-life settings.
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